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ABSTRACT 
Inverse Campaigning  
by Kai A. Konrad* 
It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public 
that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called 
inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case 
where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed 
voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in 
expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy 
proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of 
voters who win much. 
 
Keywords:  Inverse campaigning, information, voting, policy design  
JEL classification numbers: D72, D74, E61 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Inverse Campaigning  
Die Arbeit untersucht die Anreize von politischen Parteien (oder Kandidaten), Wähler 
oder Wählergruppen und die Öffentlichkeit gezielt über die Wirkung der konkurrieren-
den Wahlprogramme zu informieren. In der Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass es für eine 
Partei A vorteilhaft sein kann, öffentlich darüber zu informieren, dass eine bestimmte 
Wählergruppe Nachteile erleidet, wenn das Programm der Partei A umgesetzt wird. 
Solche Informationsaktivitäten werden inverse campaigning genannt. Die Arbeit 
bestimmt die Gleichgewichte, in denen die konkurrierenden Parteien beide inverse 
campaigning betreiben, und bestimmt die Wohlfahrtsverluste, die durch diese 
Aktivitäten verursacht werden. Ferner werden die Konsequenzen aus diesen Aktivitäten 
für den Zuschnitt erfolgreicher Wahlprogramme beschrieben. 
                                                 
*
  I thank Helmut Bester, Amihai Glazer, Daniel Krähmer and participants in seminars at UCL and at the 
University of Bonn. The usual caveat applies. 
1 Introduction
Policy reform proposals are often debated publicly. Information processed
in this debate may change the voters attitudes towards the reform. This
information is often of a particular type. Consider, for instance, the debate
on tax reform. Often, the advocates of a tax reform do not identify the
set of voters who gain, but do point out that the reform will eliminate some
undeserved large beneÞts of a minority group, or close some tax loophole
that beneÞts a minority group of voters.1 They point to a group of voters
who will lose from the reform. Similarly, the party that opposes the reform
identiÞes small interest groups which will receive large beneÞts from the
reform and accuses the reform advocates of favoring a small minority at
the expense of the large majority. For instance, the Democratic National
Platform (2000, p.5) criticized the tax reform suggested by the Republicans
as follows: The Bush tax slash ... is bigger than any cut Newt Gingrich ever
dreamed of. It would let the richest one percent of Americans aﬀort a new
sports car and middle class Americans aﬀord a warm soda. A particular
voter in the remaining 99 percent segment may beneÞt or lose from the tax
cut, depending on the allocation of the reduction in spending among the
diﬀerent categories of public expenditure that is not known. However, these
voters can correctly calculate that they will make a loss in expected value
terms.
I will call this type of information policy inverse campaigning. Inverse
campaigning diﬀers from ordinary campaigning where parties use resources
to tell the voter how beautiful, moral, and competent they are (positive
campaigning) or where they use them to tell the voter how bad, ugly, and
incompetent the opponent is (negative campaigning).2 An example that
illustrates a possible rationale for inverse campaigning is as follows. Suppose
a party X proposes a policy. Suppose there are 100 voters. If the policy
proposal is carried out, 51 voters gain one unit and 49 voters lose one unit.
Suppose further that each voter knows this distribution of gains and losses,
but does not know whether he belongs to the group of winners or to the
group of losers. In the absence of information, all voters will vote for party
X, because this choice maximizes each voters expected payoﬀ. Consider now
a party Y which opposes this policy proposal. Suppose party Y identiÞes
three voters a1, a2 and a3 who gain if the policy proposal is carried out, and
informs the public that these voters will be among the winners. Once this
1See, e.g., page 19 of the agreement between German Social Democrats and the Green
Party (http://www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1023294/Koalitionsvertrag.pdf2002).
2For a discussion of positive and negative campaigning see, e.g., Skaperdas and Grofman
(1995) and Harrington and Hess (1996).
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has happened, all remaining uninformed voters will update their probability
beliefs and their expected gains from the policy proposal fall from + 2
100
to
− 1
97
. Accordingly, the three informed voters will vote for party X, but all 97
uninformed voters will vote for party Y .
The central idea in this example that motivates party Y to engage in
inverse campaigning is as follows. It is diﬃcult and costly for a voter to
calculate whether he or she gains or loses from a particular policy reform.
This has frequently been recognized in the literature on policy reform, and
it results from the complexity of many policy proposals and their various
general equilibrium repercussions. If it becomes known that the reform aﬀects
a well-deÞned group, the information is also valuable to the voters who do not
belong to this group: if the reform takes from a group, the redistributional
impact of the reform is more likely to beneÞt the majority of voters who do
not belong to this group. Similarly, if the uninformed majority learns that
the reform shifts massive beneÞts to a small minority group, it becomes more
likely that the reform will be less advantageous to this majority of voters.
A further aspect is that this mechanism will have some impact on the
design of the reform. If a party chooses a reform that makes it easy for the
opposition to identify a minority group that gains much by this reform, the
reform is unlikely to receive majority support. However, by choosing a reform
that inßicts substantial losses to a well determined minority group the party
can increase the likelihood of adoption.
The importance of the group of incompletely informed voters has been
shown in a number of contexts. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) explain
why incompletely informed voters may abstain from voting even if they have
some expectations about the beneÞts and costs of the diﬀerent policy propos-
als. It is important for their result that the uninformed and informed voters
preferences are aligned. This is the case, for instance, if all voters gain or all
voters lose from a reform proposal. In contrast, the mechanism in this paper
focusses on reforms where there is a conßict of interests between voters about
the policy proposal, for instance, for redistributive reforms. Fernandez and
Rodrik (1991) develop a theory of structural conservativism that is based on
a statistical phenomenon similar to the one in this paper. They explain why
the majority of voters the ex ante uninformed may Þrst oppose a reform
and why a majority of voters the ex post informed voters who learn that
they will gain from the reform may then favor the reform once it has been
adopted and all the voters have learned whether they belong to the winners
or losers.3 They explain the time inconsistent preferences of voter majorities
3This learning eﬀect is also crucial for the results in Glazer and Konrad (1993) who
show that groups of voters may oppose a welfare enhancing reform if, when the reform is
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which have a status-quo preference.4 Their results also rely on the decisive-
ness of the group of incompletely informed voters. However, they consider
the information status of voters prior to the election to be exogenous and
do not consider whether and how the information status and their voting
decision can be inßuenced by strategic information revelation.
In this paper time consistency is not an issue. I consider the parties cam-
paign incentives and show that they have an incentive to strategically reveal
information publicly about who beneÞts or loses from policy adoption. I ana-
lyze the way two parties incentives interact. The focus is on whether parties
or candidates can manipulate the voting outcome in their favor by giving
information to small groups of voters, what kind of information campaigns
they use, what the welfare properties of the campaign equilibrium are, and
what inverse campaigning implies for the design of policy proposals.5
Section 2 will establish a framework in which inverse campaigning can
be studied. Section 3 will analyze one partys unilateral incentive to disclose
information. Section 4 will then turn to the problem of simultaneous in-
formation disclosure. Section 5 discusses extensions and implications of the
main result for the design of policy reform, and section 6 summarizes the
results.
2 The framework
Suppose there are two parties X and Y . Party X is committed to imple-
menting a particular reform. Party Y is committed to abstaining from this
reform. The share 1
2
+ e of voters beneÞts from the reform that party X
proposes and each of these voters has a beneÞt equal to some t > 0. These
voters are called type-x voters. The share 1
2
− e of voters loses from this
reform, and the loss of each voter in this group is the same size t as a winners
gain. These voters are called type-y voters.
The reform could be a complex change in the system of taxes or transfers
with general equilibrium repercussions. The consequences of such reform for
a single individual are diﬃcult and costly to calculate. With a continuum
adopted, they lose control over future projects.
4The literature on policy reform is vast. Some of this literature is surveyed in Rodrik
(1996). Much emphasis has been given to the issue of time consistency. However, there
seems to be little research on the role played by strategic information production for policy
adoption.
5A small literature in industrial organization considers the consequences of consumers
information status with respect to experience goods (see, e.g., Bergemann and Välimäki
1996). The inverse campaigning idea could be applied there to study Þrms incentives to
inform customers.
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of voters, rational voters are not willing to spend anything on information
acquisition. I assume that all voters are therefore uninformed about their
type, but that they know the distribution of types. The analysis could be
carried out for the case in which some groups of voters know the eﬀect of the
reform for their individual payoﬀs at some cost in terms of complexity and
notational eﬀort. As long as this share of voters is small, or if the share of
winners and losers from the reform is suﬃciently similar in size, the results
obtained here generalize to these cases. I discuss this in section 5.
Analytically the type uncertainty is described as follows. The set of voters
is V , and has a measure p(V ) = 1. A subset Vx of voters is of type x. This
subset has a measure of p(Vx) = 12 + e, and without loss of generality, e ≥ 0
(otherwise not implementing the reform and implementing the reform
switch roles). All other voters are of type y and constitute the set Vy that is
of measure p(Vy) = 12 − e. Voters know the distribution of types, but do not
know their own type. Accordingly, without any further information, each
voter considers the probability ξ of being of type-x as ξ = 1
2
+ e.
Parties are oﬃce motivated. They care about winning more than 50
percent of the votes (as in presidential elections or the competition between
two candidates more generally). Let θY and θX = 1 − θY be the shares of
voters voting for party Y and party X, respectively. Then party Y s beneÞt
is
Ψ(θY ) =
 1 if θY > 1/21/2 if θY = 1/2
0 if θY < 1/2
(1)
and partyXs beneÞt is 1−Ψ(θY ), where the beneÞt of winning is normalized
to 1.
The sequence of actions is as follows. In stage 0 nature assigns a type
to each voter. That is, each voter becomes an element of Vx or Vy. All this
is common knowledge to the parties and the voters, but voters do not know
their own type.
Given a continuum of voters, each voter has a negligible impact on the
election outcome and has no incentive to invest resources in becoming in-
formed. Parties incentives to invest in information on voters types, how-
ever, can be considerable: as will be shown, parties can aﬀect the election
outcome by collecting information on very small groups of voters. The in-
formation acquisition decision is made in stage 1. Parties X and Y can
choose respectively sets A and B that are measurable subsets of V and then
inform the voters in these sets about their types. For simplicity, if a party
chooses a subset I with measure p(I), this is not a pure random selection;
the party can determine how big the share of voters in I is that belongs to Vx
or to Vy, that is, they can choose how many x−types or y−types they would
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like to identify and reveal.6 The partys cost of information acquisition for a
set I of voters is proportional to the number of voters who become informed
about their type, that is, the cost is c · p(I). Accordingly, the payoﬀ of party
Y becomes
GY (A,B) = Ψ(θY (A,B))− cp(B), (2)
where A is the set of voters whose types are identiÞed by party X, B is the
set chosen by party Y, and θY is the share of voters who will choose party
Y given these choices about information acquisition. The function θY (A,B)
will be determined later. The payoﬀ of party X is determined analogously.
In stage 2 the choices of sets A and B and the measures p(A ∩ Vx),
p(A∩Vy), p(B ∩Vx) and p(B ∩Vy) are publicly observed and the voters who
are in these sets also learn their individual types. Accordingly, some voters
know their individual types and some other voters know that they belong to
the set V \(A∪B) and can update their prior beliefs about their probabilities
of being type x or type y accordingly.
In stage 3 voters vote sincerely; voters who know their types vote for
the party whose programme they prefer, and voters who do not know their
types vote for the party whose programme maximizes their expected payoﬀ.
Before proceeding to describe the equilibria with information acquisition,
it is instructive to show the outcome where there is no access to information,
i.e., if A ∪ B ≡ ∅. In this case each voter is uninformed and maximizes an
expected payoﬀ that is equal to t(1
2
+ e)− t(1
2
− e) = 2et if party X is elected
and equal to 0 if party Y is elected. Accordingly, all voters vote for party X
if e > 0. We state this benchmark case as
Proposition 1 If all voters are uninformed, all voters vote for the party that
maximizes the expected payoﬀ of the uninformed voter. If e > 0 all vote for
party X.
3 Unilateral inverse campaigning
Let e > 0. Suppose only party Y can acquire information, i.e., A = ∅. The
case in which only partyX can acquire information is uninteresting for e > 0,
because in this case party X wins all the votes if all parties abstain from
6Alternatively, one could assume that each party Þrst chooses a set I of voters whose
types are then determined and then chooses which subset of voters from I the party will
inform in public about their types. This revelation choice is an additional complication
because the voters out-of-equilibrium expectations could be conditional on these choices,
and this could generate further equilibria.
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information acquisition. The general case in which all parties simultaneously
acquire and reveal information is considered in section 4.
The mapping between a choice of a set B of voters and voters choices
is as follows. All voters from the set B become fully informed about their
types and vote according to their types. All other voters remain incompletely
informed about their types. However, they do update their beliefs. Their
beliefs about the probability of being of type y are updated as follows. For
any subsets A,B ∈ V deÞne
Ax ≡ A ∩ Vx, Ay ≡ A ∩ Vy, Bx ≡ B ∩ Vx, By ≡ B ∩ Vy. (3)
Let party Y choose set B. Given that ξ = 1
2
+ e was a voters probability of
being of type x in the absence of information, using Bayes Rule, for i /∈ B
the updated probability (1− ξ(B)) of being of type y becomes7
1− ξ(B) ≡ 1− ξ − p(Bx)
1− p(B) =
1
2
− e− p(By)
1− p(B) (4)
and i votes for Y if this probability is larger than 1/2. For the case of
equality, where only one party acquires information, adopting the following
tie-breaking rule in this section is without loss of generality and makes the
analysis as simple as possible. This rule is that a voter who is indiﬀerent
votes for party Y .
Party Y will not choose to identify voters who, if informed, prefer party
Y . More formally:
Property 3.1 Party Y will choose some B with p(By) = 0.
For a proof I show that any B with p(By) > 0 is strictly dominated by
B = B\By. To see this note Þrst that B has a lower information cost than
B by cp(By). It is, therefore, suﬃcient to show that Ψ(B) ≤ Ψ( B).
(i) If B yields (1− ξ(B)) < 1/2, then Ψ(B) = 0. But Ψ( B) ≥ 0.
(ii) If B yields (1−ξ(B)) = 1/2, then the total number of voters voting for
Y is not lower if the party chooses B. The reason is as follows. (1− ξ(B)) =
1/2 implies (1− ξ( B)) > 1/2 by equation (4). Hence, all uninformed voters
vote for party Y if party Y chooses B. Moreover, for a choice of B = B\By,
the set V \ B of uninformed voters includes By. Accordingly, Ψ( B) = 1 ≥
Ψ(B).
7Both parties and voters are fully informed about e, and all new information about A
and B is shared among all players. This simpliÞes the analysis because Bayesian updating
then strictly follows (4), and equilibria can be ruled out that could be based on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs of voters if parties had, or gained, superior information and could select
the information they reveal.
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(iii) If (1− ξ(B)) > 1/2, this implies that (1− ξ( B)) > 1/2 as the same
reasoning as in (ii) applies.
Summarizing, Ψ( B) ≥ Ψ(B) and cp( B) < cp(B) if p(By) > 0. ¤
Property 3.1 suggests that party Y does not beneÞt from informing type-y
voters. It chooses a set B such that p(B) = p(Bx). It will inform only type-x
voters about their type. Intuitively, Y wins if, and only if, the incompletely
informed voters are decisive and vote for party Y . Identifying voters who gain
from the reform (type−x voters) is useful for party Y because uninformed
voters consider it more likely that they will lose from the reform if more
voters who gain are identiÞed. However, identifying reform losers (type−y
voters) is counterproductive for party Y as the remaining uninformed voters
consider it less likely that they will belong to the losers of the reform.
A second, more straightforward observation is
Property 3.2 Any two sets B,B0 with p(By) = p(B0y) = 0 and p(B) =
p(B0) yield the same θY .
Property 3.2 states that which particular subset of voters from the subset
Vx of type-x voters is chosen and informed by party Y does not matter for
the voting outcome. Only the size of the set Bx of voters of type x that are
informed matters for the voting outcome. The reason is that these voters will
vote for x in any case, and all other voters update according to (4), but this
updating is based only on the measure of the set of voters who are informed
and not on the particular set.8
Party Y s optimal campaign policy is therefore characterized by the op-
timal measure p of voters from the set Vx whose type is revealed. To Þnd the
optimal p, four ranges of p have to be distinguished. For p < 2e, the unin-
formed voters are decisive and vote for X. For p ∈ [2e, 1/2) the uninformed
voters are decisive and vote for Y . Note that this range is non-empty only
if e < 1/4. For p = 1/2, there is a tie with θY = θX = 1/2. For larger p,
there is a majority of voters who know they are of type x. The maximum
payoﬀ therefore is attained at p = 2e (and at a slightly larger p for other
tie-breaking rules) or at p = 0. The choice p = 2e yields higher payoﬀ than
p = 0 if
2ec < 1. (5)
The inequality (5) describes that the minimum cost of informing a suﬃcient
number of voters needed to change the decision of the remaining uninformed
8This property depends on the fact that all voters in the respective sets Vx and Vy
are homogenous. In section 5 generalizations will be discussed with a continuum of fully
heterogenous voters. It will become clear from this discussion that, for heterogenous sets
Vx and Vy, party Y prefers to identify groups of voters who gain most strongly from party
Xs policy proposal.
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voters (left hand side of (5)) is smaller than the beneÞt from being elected
that was normalized to unity (right hand side of (5)). Even for extremely high
information cost, this condition can easily be fulÞlled if e is not much diﬀerent
from 0, that is, if the set of beneÞciaries of the reform is approximately 1/2.
We summarize this as
Proposition 2 Suppose only party Y can make use of inverse campaigning.
Let e < 1/4. If 2ec < 1, a situation in which Party Y reveals information
about a set B ⊂ Vx of voters of type x with p(B) = 2e is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
To make this intuitive, recall the Þnite numbers example in the introduc-
tion where there are 51 voters of type x and 49 voters of type y and in which
case e equals one percent. If no voters are informed, party X wins: all voters
vote for X, because each has a 51:49 chance of being of type x. If party Y
reveals the types of two type-x voters, these two voters will vote for X, but
the remaining 98 uninformed voters change their beliefs. Their chances of
being of types x or y are now 49:49, and, given the tie-breaking rule, they
will all vote for Y . The minimum percentage of type-x voters who need to
be informed to cause this reversal of the uninformed voters decision is two
percent, or 2e. Party Y would not want to incur unnecessary cost to inform
even more voters. Further, the cost condition states that party Y s cost of
informing two voters is lower than the gain from winning. Finally, if e > 1/4,
in the Þnite numbers example this translates into a distribution with more
than 75 voters of type x and less than 25 voters of type y. Party Y would
have to inform more than Þfty voters that they are of type x to make the
uninformed vote for Y . But then the uninformed voters are a minority and
the informed majority votes for X. Hence, party Y could not change the
outcome by inverse campaigning.
In this section an asymmetric situation was considered in which party
X had an advantage in the uninformed situation (e > 0), but party Y
was allowed to acquire and disseminate information about voters actual
types/preferences. This analysis was carried out mainly in order to reveal
the intuition about why a party might want to inform groups of voters that
they are better oﬀ by voting against this party. This type of eﬀort was called
inverse campaigning.
It is more plausible for both parties to have similar opportunities of ac-
quiring and disseminating information, and I turn to this case next.
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4 Simultaneous campaigning
Depending on the distribution of the voters types and the comparison be-
tween the cost of information acquisition and dissemination and the beneÞt
of being elected, there are many cases that could be considered if both parties
can acquire and disseminate information. I concentrate on the case that is
perhaps most relevant for which
1
8
> e ≥ 0, (6)
and for which the cost of information acquisition is in the range
1
2e
> c >
4
1− 8e . (7)
The other cases can be considered brießy when discussing these conditions.
The second inequality in (6) repeats that partyX was chosen such that e ≥ 0.
The Þrst inequality in (6) describes that the two alternatives proposed by the
two parties split the voter population approximately evenly into winners and
losers. If e is larger than 1/8, then party Y has a considerable disadvantage.
Like with unilateral inverse campaigning, inverse campaigning will break
down if one partys advantage is too large.
Condition (7) describes that the cost of informing voters is not negligible,
but that it is also not prohibitively high. This assumption is important
for eliminating cases in which information acquisition does not take place
because it is prohibitively costly, or in which information acquisition is very
inexpensive. The Þrst inequality is identical with (5): if 1
2e
> c does not
hold, there will be no campaigning and party X will win. Note, however,
that 1
2e
> c always holds if e is suﬃciently small, that is, if neither party has
a considerable advantage. Further, if c > 4
1−8e does not hold, then a partys
gain from winning is higher than the cost of informing about a quarter of all
voters. In this case the equilibria will be in mixed strategies, and the results
derived below will partially carry over to this case although parties may also
use other strategies than inverse campaigning.9
We Þrst note:
Proposition 3 If e ≥ 0 is suﬃciently small, no equilibrium in pure strate-
gies exists.
9If the second inequality in (7) is violated, the total size of the voter population induces
a cap on inverse campaigning, and some of the equilibria are similar to contest equilibria
as in Che and Gale (1998).
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For a proof of the nonexistence of a pure-strategy equilibrium suppose
that (A,B) characterizes an equilibrium in pure strategies. Note Þrst that
p(A) = 0 cannot hold in the equilibrium. If party X chooses some A with
p(A) = 0, then by 1/(2e) > c, Y can optimally choose some B with p(By) = 0
and p(Bx) slightly above 2e, because this makes B win the election and has
the lowest cost among the choices that make Y win. But this makes A with
p(A) = 0 suboptimal for party X. Suppose now p(A) > 0. Party Y s optimal
reaction to this A is either some appropriately chosen B(A) with p(Bx) > 0
that makes Y win with certainty, or p(B) = 0. For both these cases, the
choice of A is not an optimal answer to B(A): if p(B(A)) = 0 then some A
with p( Ay) = δ for small non-negative δ dominates A, and if B(A) makes Y
win with certainty then some A with p( A) = 0 dominates A. Hence, some A
with p(A) > 0 can also not be Xs pure equilibrium strategy and this shows
that there can be no pure-strategy equilibrium. ¤
Here, and in what follows, I adopt the rule that uninformed voters who are
indiﬀerent because they think that they are equally likely to be type x or type
y, randomize and vote for partyX or party Y with equal probabilities. While
it does not matter for the qualitative results, this tie-breaking rule simpliÞes
the analysis of the case where the two parties simultaneously choose inverse
campaigning eﬀort. This tie-breaking rule leads to a unique voting outcome
for all given choices of A and B. All voters i ∈ A ∪ B vote according to
their type. All voters who are not in this set update their beliefs and vote
accordingly.
Before we characterize an equilibrium we notice two properties:
Property 4.1 None of the parties will choose some set I of voters with
p(I) > 1
4
− 2e.
This property is an implication of the cost condition c > 4
1−8e . The choice
of some I with p(I) ≥ 1
4
− 2e has a higher cost than the maximum gain from
winning.
Property 4.2 (Inverse campaigning) If A and B are in the equilibrium
support of parties X and Y , respectively, then p(Ax) = p(By) = 0.
This property states that party X acquires information only to identify
type−y voters and to reveal their type, and party Y acquires information
only to identify type-x voters and to reveal their type. Accordingly, if a
party uses resources in order to inform voter groups and the public about
the implications of the reform, the party informs interest groups who then
oppose this partys programme.
A proof of property 4.2 is in the appendix. The intuition for this prop-
erty is as follows. The decisive group of voters is the group of incompletely
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informed voters who have to vote on the basis of expectations about whether
they beneÞt or lose from the reform. For party X it is important to change
the prior beliefs of this group favorably. If party X reveals that some group
of voters is of type y, the size of the decisive group of voters will be reduced
and the newly informed voters will vote for party Y . But the group of in-
completely informed voters is still decisive and the fact that some measure of
type-y voters has been identiÞed and eliminated from the set of incompletely
informed voters will make it more likely that a voter in this incompletely
informed group belongs to the voters of type x who prefer party X. Hence,
party X beneÞts from informing and revealing voters of type y. Conversely,
party X is harmed if party X reveals that some group of voters is of type x.
Incompletely informed voters will then revise their probability estimates and
will consider it less likely that they are of type x. The analogous reasoning
explains why it is not in party Y s interest to inform incompletely informed
voters of type y of their type.
The following proposition characterizes an equilibrium for a broad range
of parameters as shown in (6) and (7).
Proposition 4 Suppose both parties can make inverse campaigning eﬀort.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies exists that is described by
choices of sets A and B made by parties X and Y , respectively, such that
p(Ax) = 0 and p(By) = 0 for all A in the equilibrium support of X and all B
in the equilibrium support of Y , and with p(A) and p(B) distributed according
to cumulative distribution functions FX and FY with
FX(p(A)) =
½
2ec + cp(A) for p(A) ∈ [0, 1
c
− 2e]
1 for p(A) > 1
c
− 2e (8)
and
FY (p(B)) =
 2ec for p(B) ∈ [0, 2e]cp(B) for p(B) ∈ [2e, 1c ]
1 for p(B) > 1
c
.
(9)
The equilibrium payoﬀs are 2ec for party X and 0 for party Y .
For a proof that (8) and (9) establish an equilibrium in mixed strategies,
given properties 4.1 and 4.2 it is suﬃcient to show that these probability
distribution functions establish mutually optimal responses. To see this,
consider Þrst the payoﬀ of party Y for diﬀerent choices p(B). Y wins if
(1
2
− e)− p(Ay) > (12 + e)− p(Bx) or, equivalently, if p(Bx)− 2e > p(Ay). If
X chooses the mixed strategy as in (8), then party Y wins with probability
FX(p(Bx) − 2e)). Party Y s payoﬀ from some choice B with p(By) = 0 is
equal to
FX(p(Bx)− 2e)− cp(Bx). (10)
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This can be seen as follows. As the beneÞt of being elected is normalized to
1, the expected beneÞt of being elected is equal to the probability that Y
wins the election. For a choice p(B) = p(B ∩ Vx) = p(Bx), this probability
is given by (8) as FX(p(Bx)− 2e). The second term in (10) is the campaign
cost. The payoﬀ in (10) is equal to zero if p(Bx) ∈ {0} ∪ [2e, 1c ] and smaller
than zero for all B with p(Bx) outside this range. Hence, any mixed strategy
by Y with support {0}∪ [2e, 1
c
] is an optimal response to FX as deÞned in (8).
Similarly, party X wins if (1+ e)− p(Bx) > (1− e)− p(Ay), or, equivalently,
if p(Ay) > p(Bx) − 2e. This is the case with probability FY (p(Ay) + 2e) if
party Y chooses the mixed strategy described by (9). Party Xs payoﬀ from
choosing some set Ay of y−types becomes
FY (p(Ay) + 2e)− cp(Ay). (11)
This payoﬀ is equal to 2ec for all A for which p(Ax) = 0 and p(A) ∈ [0, 1c−2e]
and smaller than 2ec for all other A. ¤
The mixed strategy equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 4
follows straightforwardly from the theory of all-pay auctions, as in Hillman
and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996). They also show
that the equilibrium cumulative density functions in the two-player all-pay
auction are unique for the case e = 0, and their line of reasoning extends to
small e > 0. The important element of the proof of Proposition 4 is therefore
property 4.2 which makes sure that parties choose A and B from disjunct
sets. This ensures that the parties payoﬀs are functions of the measures of
A and B and not of the sets A or B themselves, and this turns the problem
into a simple all-pay auction.
The main result can be summarized as follows. If neither party is partic-
ularly disadvantaged by its commitment to support or to oppose a particular
policy reform, and if voters are uncertain whether they belong to the winners
or losers of the reform, then parties may have an incentive to change the de-
cisions of incompletely informed voters who maximize their expected payoﬀ
by revealing how the reform will aﬀect some minority groups of voters. A
party will typically publicly identify groups that have good reason to oppose
this partys proposal in order to change the prior beliefs of the remaining
group of incompletely informed voters favorably. Proposition 4 also implies
that the sum of the parties expected rents in the equilibrium is equal to 2ec
and that these fully accrue to the party that would be elected in the absence
of campaigning. Hence, much of the parties rent is dissipated in the inverse
campaigning eﬀort. For the case of symmetry (e = 0), all rents are fully
dissipated by these activities.
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5 Generalizations and implications
Ex ante informed voters. In the previous sections I assumed that all
voters are uninformed unless one of the parties informs them about their
types. For some reforms some sets of voters may know the direction of the
impact of the reform even in the absence of campaigning. However, for some
other sets of voters, the impact of the reform may be unclear. In this case the
results in the paper continue to hold as long as the set of voters who know
they gain is not much smaller or larger than the set of voters who know
that they lose. Suppose, for instance, the sets are of precisely equal size.
Then these ex ante informed voters neutralize each other perfectly, and the
aggregate set of these voters has no impact on the election outcome. Hence,
the election outcome is determined by the set of ex ante uninformed voters.
The incentives for inßuencing the voting outcome by inverse campaigning
are even stronger in this case. The reason is that the sets A or B needed to
change the incompletely informed voters decisions are even smaller, because
there are fewer incompletely informed voters.
Skewed payoﬀ distributions. One could expect that voters gains and
losses from reform are not a binary variable, and that the distribution of
gains and losses for many reforms is skewed. This complicates the analysis,
but strengthens the incentives for inverse campaigning. In this case, the
parties are no longer indiﬀerent to the subset of voters of the opposite type
that they prefer to identify. Consider the example of a purely redistributive
tax reform that leaves aggregate income unchanged. Uninformed voters will
like a reform if a set of, say, 10 percent of voters is identiÞed who all lose
one unit because this increases the expected payoﬀ for uninformed voters.
However, they will like the reform even better if a set of 1 percent of voters is
identiÞed who lose 100 units each. The increase in their expected payoﬀ from
this latter information is much stronger than for the former information, even
though the set of voters who become informed is much smaller. If campaign
costs are proportional to the size of the set of voters whose type is identiÞed,
then parties will prefer to identify sets of voters whose stakes in the reform
are high. Inverse campaigning towards voters who have high stakes in the
reform is more eﬀective.
Design of policy reform. The insight about skewed payoﬀs and the eﬀec-
tiveness of inverse campaigning has some implications for the optimal design
of policy reforms. Suppose a party X designs a policy reform proposal that
is purely redistributive and does not change aggregate rents. It is useful for
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party X if there is a small minority group A that incurs major per capita
losses from the reform. Party X can publicly identify this group. This cam-
paigning is very eﬀective. Its cost is low, given that the set A is small, and
the size of the set of decisive voters is also not reduced by much. However,
because each voter in A loses much if the reform is enacted, the gains of the
uninformed voters must be high. The more each voter in set A loses, the
larger the increases in the expected gains of the uninformed voters. Con-
versely, it is dangerous for party X if the reform generates large per capita
beneÞts for some small group. The opponent of party X will identify this
group of reform winners. This information will lower the expected gain from
the reform for the large set of incompletely informed voters and will make it
more likely they will oppose the reform.
Accordingly, with inverse campaigning, a policy proposal for redistribu-
tion is more likely to succeed if there are no small groups of voters who gain
much, but there are rather small groups who lose much. Parties may take
this into account when designing redistributional policies.
Inverse campaigning is only one of many explanations for the precise form
of legislation that may add or counteract each other. It is interesting to note,
for instance, that the implications of inverse campaigning for policy choices
in a voting context are the reverse of the predictions of Olsons (1965) logic of
collective action in a lobbying context. He suggests that small interest groups
with high stakes successfully inßuence policy outcomes to their beneÞt.
6 Summary and discussion
This paper considers the question why parties or candidates in a two-party
system use resources for inverse campaigning: they inform the public that
small interest groups gain by a victory of their competitor, so that these
interest groups also vote for their competitor. The intuitive reason for this
behavior is that the information about other voters gains or losses from a
policy reform changes the perceptions and expectations of uninformed voters
about whether they will gain or lose from this reform.
What are the crucial assumptions for this puzzling result and how plau-
sible is inverse campaigning for diﬀerent types of policy reform? First, it is
important for the voters to be uncertain about what a policy reform means
for them personally. This assumption is probably fulÞlled for many reform
proposals and for a large set of voters in a complex environment where vot-
ers have very little incentive to use resources to learn whether they gain or
lose from a reform. Second, it is important for the parties to be able to
acquire information about the groups of voters which win or lose by the re-
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form, and to be able to disseminate this information. Parties then can indeed
inßuence the election outcome favorably by inverse campaigning. Third, it
was assumed here that the shares of winners and losers and the size of their
losses or gains are given. Hence, the revelation of information about a group
of winners does not aﬀect the expected quality of a policy proposal as such.
Some policy proposals are more likely to meet this condition than others. For
instance, implementing a reform that has considerable allocative eﬀects may
increase or decrease eﬃciency, and there may also be uncertainty about the
aggregate eﬃciency gains of a reform. Searching for, and Þnding, individuals
who beneÞt may then be an indication of the proposals good quality. If this
type of uncertainty is suﬃciently important, it weakens the incentives for in-
verse campaigning. For instance, in a world in which the beneÞts of a policy
proposal are perfectly positively correlated across all voters, identifying some
voters who beneÞt from the proposal will make other voters revise upwards
their expectations about what the proposal will mean to them. However,
there are many policy proposals that have reasonably well known eﬃciency
eﬀects in the aggregate, but for which it may be diﬃcult to determine who
wins and who loses. A situation where what is considered good news for one
group of voters is bad news for other voters is the context in which inverse
campaigning is most likely to play a role.
7 Appendix
Proof of property 4.2. Consider some A with p(A) < 1
4
−2e. Suppose B with
p(By) > 0 is an optimal answer to this A. Note Þrst that any B with p(Ay∩
By) > 0 is suboptimal for party Y as it is dominated by B\(Ay ∩By) which
generates the same information for voters and has lower cost for party Y . I
therefore restrict consideration to B with p(By) > 0 and p(Ay ∩ By) = 0. I
show that B = B\By dominates B.
First, B has an information cost that is lower by cp(By).
Second, the expected gain from becoming elected is not reduced by B,
compared to B, that is, Ψ(B) ≤ Ψ( B). To show this, note that, by Property
4.1, at least some votes by the set of incompletely informed voters are required
for winning the election. Y cannot win without at least some support by
incompletely informed voters. Incompletely informed voters vote for Y if
their probability of being of type y is larger than 1/2. Their beliefs (1 − ξ)
about this probability are updated for given A and B according to Bayes
Rule such that
(1− ξ) = 1− (
1
2
− e)− p(Ay ∪By)
1− p(Ay ∪By)− p(Ax ∪Bx) .
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This term is decreasing in p(By), as (12 + e) ≥ 1/2 > p(Ax∪Bx) by Property
4.1. Now consider three cases. First, if (1− ξ(A,B)) < 1/2, then Ψ(A,B) =
0 ≤ Ψ(A, B). That is, the election outcome under B cannot be worse than
underB if party Y loses for sure when it choosesB. Second, if (1−ξ(A,B)) =
1/2, then partyX gets half of the uninformed votes, and, depending on p(Ax)
and p(By), this may, but need not, be enough to win. However, if party Y
chooses B in this case, then (1 − ξ) > 1/2 and party Y wins for sure. The
same reasoning applies if (1 − ξ(A,B)) > 1/2. A choice of B also leads to
a sure election victory. But if (B\By) dominates B for any given A, then it
also dominates B for any random mixture of As.
Now consider some choice B by party Y with p(By) = 0 and show that
any A with p(Ax) > 0 is also suboptimal for party X given this choice B by
party Y . For a proof, note Þrst that p(Ax) < 14 − 2e and p(Bx) < 14 − 2e by
Property 4.1. Suppose some A with p(Ax) > 0 is optimal. Then A = A\Ax
dominates A. To see this Þrst note that A always has an information cost
that is lower than the cost for A by cp(Ax). But, in addition, the expected
election beneÞt is not higher for A than for A for the following reason. By
p(Ax ∪ Bx) < 12 − 4e and p(Ay ∪ By) < 12 − 4e, the group of incompletely
informed voters is decisive. The probability for being type x is updated
according to
ξ =
(1 + e)− p(Ax ∪Bx)
1− p(Ay ∪By)− p(Ax ∪Bx) ,
and this term is strictly decreasing in p(Ax∪Bx), as (1+e) ≥ 1/2 > p(Ay∪By)
by Property 4.1. For ξ(A,B) < 1/2 the partyX loses the election if it chooses
A, and a choice A can only increase election probabilities. For ξ(A,B) =
1/2 the choice of A turns the possible victory into a sure victory, and for
ξ(A,B) > 1/2 the party Y s election victory is sure for both the choice of A
and the choice of A. Again, the argument extends to a random selection of
B, and this concludes the proof. ¤
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